Income Tax Consequences Of
Corporate Debentures by Kaufman, Charles L.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 2
Fall 9-1-1948
Income Tax Consequences Of Corporate
Debentures
Charles L. Kaufman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles L. Kaufman, Income Tax Consequences Of Corporate Debentures, 5 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 167
(1948), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol5/iss2/2
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume V 1948 Number 2
INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
CORPORATE DEBENTURES
CHARLES L. KAUFMAN*
The capitalization of a corporation frequently presents problems of
business and finance, the solution of which should be governed by con-
siderations wholly apart from a desire to minimize taxes. Nothing-
not even taxes-should interfere with the pursuit of a policy which is
calculated to meet the corporation's needs and to keep it healthy. But
the corporate executive has both the right and the duty to weigh and
consider the tax consequences, in reaching every major decision on
matters respecting which alternative courses of action are available.
The use of debentures to obtain needed capital may be prompted
or necessitated by one or more of a variety of factors not related to taxa-
tion. The need for capital may be only temporary. The payment of a
fixed interest rate may leave a greater portion of the earnings available
for the common stockholders. The condition of the investment market
may render it impracticable or impossible to acquire the capital, ex-
cept through the creation of debt. The issuance of stock may" cause an
undesirable dilution of the interests of existing stockholders, or loss
of their control. Where the corporation is dependent upon its stock-
holders for financial assistance-as is often true in the case of small
corporations-they may demand a security with a fixed maturity and
interest rate, either because of their needs, or their desire to limit the
risk and exposure involved.1 On the other hand, sound financial
policy might preclude the use of debentures, because the corporation's
credit might be thereby impaired or because the corporation's earn-
ings are so uncertain that it should not be burdened with the obliga-
tion of making fixed interest payments. 2
Through the use of debentures, a substantial tax saving may accrue
to the corporation. This does not mean, however, that there will neces-
sarily be a net over-all tax saving to the stockholders, because the re-
*Member of the Norfolk, Virginia Bar.
'See 19 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Perm. ed. 1940) § 9o73; Husband and
Thomas, Principles of Accounting (1935) 44o-44i.
2See Dewing, Corporation Finance (1931) 56.
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duction in the corporation's income tax may be wholly, or at least
partially, offset by the intangible personal property tax which the stock-
holders may be required to bear. For instance, Virginia residents must
pay a tax on debentures and other evidences of debt in an amount
equal to one-half per cent of the fair market value thereof, whereas
no such tax is assessable on stock. But this article will be concerned only
with the federal income tax aspects of debentures.
To illustrate the corporate tax saving which results from the use
of debentures, let us assume that X-Corporation, at the time of its or-
ganization, requires one million dollars, and that it issues $5oo,ooo
common stock and $5oo,ooo 4% debentures. Inasmuch as the Internal
Revenue Code3 allows as a deduction in computing net income "all in-
terest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness," X-
Corporation will have an annual interest deduction of $20,000.00 in
determining its income tax liability.
Implicit in the statutory sanction is the mandate that what is de-
ducted must be "interest," and that such interest must have been paid
or accrued on an existing "indebtedness." The Commissioner's regula-
tions, accordingly, sound an appropriate warning: "So-called interest
on preferred stock, which is in reality a dividend thereon, cannot be
deducted in computing net income." 4 It has been frequently desired
to avoid the financial disadvantages of bonds, but to obtain advantage
of the interest deduction. As a result, many hybrid securities, possess-
ing some attributes of bonds, some of stock, have been created, and a
lot of litigation has ensued.
Bonds or Stock?
Stated broadly, the question of whether such securities are to be
treated as bonds or stock is one of substance and of fact, the answer to
which is dependent upon all the circumstances. 5 As in most tax cases, the
Commissioner is aided by the burden which is imposed upon the tax-
payer of proving the so-called interest payment to be in fact "interest"
3Section 23 (b).
'Regulations 111, § 29 .23 (b)-i.
'See Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corp., 6 T. C. 73o (1946), rev'd on another
issue, i6o F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 6th, 1947); Edward G. Janeway, 2 T. C. 197 (1943),
aff'd 147 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); Com'r v. Schmoll Fils Associated, Inc., iio
F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Com'r v. Proctor Shop, 82 F. (2d) 792 (C. C. A. 9th,
1936); Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 26.09. With respect to the
applicability of the same principle to corporate law in general it has been said: "The
fact that an instrument is called a bond is not conclusive as to its nature, but re-
gard must be had to the substance of the instrument." Fletcher, op. cit. supra, § 2635.
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upon an "indebtedness."0 Since, then, each case must rest on its own
facts, it is not surprising to find a multitude of cases on the subject.7
In a leading case it was said: "Precedents are abundant, but because
of the widely-varying fact bases upon which the conclusions are
reached, they serve only as guides. Many are the criteria named to aid
in the determination. Sometimes a particular one is called decisive,-or
the most important test,-sometimes a combination of the elements
sways the determination." s
In the last three years approximately twenty-five cases of "interest
versus dividend" have been decided. In about sixty percent thereof
the Commissioner's disallowance of the deduction was upheld. Those
cases, as well as some of the earlier ones, emphasize the importance of
the following criteria: 9
1. Fixed maturity date. This is probably the most important in-
gredient of a debenture, if it is to come within the ambit of indebted-
ness. Ordinarily, there must be a fixed maturity date on which the
holder can demand payment of the obligation.10 However, the exis-
tence of a fixed maturity date will not necessarily assure classification
of the security as indebtedness. 13 Moreover, the security may be treated
OSee, e.g., Texas Drivurself System, Inc., T. C. Memo. Op., Docket No. 112159,
Mar. 31, 1944.
7References herein are confined to a few of the older, leading cases and the
more recent cases, especially those decided in 1945 and later years. All the authori-
ties are collected in Mertens, op. cit. supra, §§ 9.24 and 26.10.
8Com'r v. Meridian & Thirteenth R. Co., 132 F. (2d) 182, 185 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1942>.
OProfessor Mertens sets out ten principal considerations. Briefly they are: in-
tent of the parties; nomenclature; a fixed maturity date; preference as to payment
of interest and principal at maturity; whether voting powers are granted holders;
whether security bears a fixed rate of interest; redemption or retirement provisions;
unconditional obligation to pay; whether redeemable at election of holder; amount
of risk involved. Mertens, op. cit. supra., § 26.1o.
"°See Pottstown Finance Co., Inc. v. U. S., 73 F. Supp. 101, (E. D. Pa. 1947);
Bowerstock Mills & Power Co., T. C. Memo. Op., Docket No. 9 86, Oct. 16, 1947; Mul-
lin Bldg Corp., 9 T. C ..... ' No. 52, Sept. 16, 1947, aff'd Mullin Bldg. Corp. v. Com'r
of Internal Revenue, 167 F. (2d) 1OO (C. C. A. 3 d, 1948); Texas Drivurself System,
Inc., supra, n. 6; Brown-Rogers-Dixson Co. v. Com'r, 122 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 4 th,
1941); Com'r v. Schmoll Fils Assoc'd, Inc., supra, n. 5- Cf. 25o Hudson St. Corp., T. C.
Memo. Op., Docket No. 7468, Aug. 9, 1946; Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corp.,
supra, n. 5; Com'r v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 141 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. ist, 1944); Chas.
Olson & Sons, Inc., T. C. Memo. Op., Docket No. iogg8o, Nov. 1O, 1942; Com'r v.
Proctor Shop, supra, n. 5; Com'r v. 0. P. P. Holding Corp., 76 F. (2d) 1I (C. C. A.
2d, 1935). -
"E.g. 1432 Broadway Corporation, 4 T. C. 1158 (1945), aff'd i6o F. (2d) 885
(C. C. A. 2d,1947); Com'r v. Meridian &: Thirteenth R. Co., supra, n. 8. The fact
that the existence of a definite maturity date is not alone controlling may be con-
sidered settled in view of the decision in Talbot Mills v. Com'r, 3 T. C. 94, aff'd
146 F. (2d) 809, 326 U. S. 521, 66 S. Ct. 299, 90 L. ed. 278 (1946).
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as an indebtedness even in the absence of a fixed maturity date.12
2. Nomenclature. Calling the securities "debentures" is merely an-
other factor in favor of the taxpayer. Where the securities have not
been so named, the deduction has been disallowed.13 Where, however,
the securities have been called debentures, the deduction has been
both allowed 14 and disallowed.15
3. Subordination to rights of others creditors. Where the rights of
the debenture holders have been subordinate to those of general credi-
tors, the deduction has been both allowed 16 and disallowed.17 In a lead-
ing case decided by the Second Circuit, it was held that it was not fatal
to the debenture holder's status as a creditor that his claim was subordi-
nate to those of general creditors: "The fact that ultimately he must
be paid a definite sum at a fixed time marks his relation to the corpora-
tion as that of creditor rather than shareholder. The final criterion
between creditor and shareholder we believe to be the contingency of
payment. The shareholder is entitled to nothing, prior to liquidation,
except out of earnings. ... These debenture bondholders were not so
limited. The interest could be ... collected.., from the corpus....,,s
But in a later case, the Tax Court stated that one "fundamental basis
for our conclusion that these securities are more nearly like preferred
stock than indebtedness is the fact that the debentures... are subordi-
nated to the claims of all creditors .... ."19 In an unusual case, de-
cided by the Fourth Circuit, where the rights of the debenture holders
were preferred over the rights of other creditors, even though there was
no fixed maturity date, the deduction was allowed.
2 0
4. Interest. If so-called interest is payable irrespective of earnings,
it is manifest that the securities more nearly resemble debentures than
12Helvering v. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co., 90 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
Similarly, to the effect that the maturity date may be postponed, see Cleveland
Adolph Mayer Realty Corp., supra, n. 5.1 1Bowersock Mills & Power Co., supra, n. io; Mullin Bldg. Corp., supra, n. o.
14u25o Hudson St. Corp., supra, n. io; Chas. Olson & Sons, Inc., supra, n. 1o;
Com'r v. 0. P. P. Holding Corp., supra, n. io.1 1Swoby Corp., Docket No. 10284, Oct. 31, 1947; Chas. L. Huisking & Co., 4 T. C.
595 (1945); Com'r v. Schmoll Fils Assoc'd, Inc., supra, n. 5.
"Com'r v. H. P. Hood & Sons, supra, n. io; Com'r v. Proctor Shop, supra, n. 5;
Com'r v. 0. P. P. Holding Corp., supra, n. to.
"TSwoby Corp., supra, n. 15; Pottstown Finance Co., Inc. v. U. S., supra, n. 1o;
Mullin Bldg. Corp., supra, n. so; Chas. L. Hisisking & Co., supra, n. 15; The Humko
Co., T. C. Memo. Op., Dockets No. 112235, 79, Dec. 11, 1943; Com'r v. Schmoll Fils
Assoc'd, Inc., supra, n. 5.
1 'Com'r v. 0. P. P. Holding Corp., supra, n. so, at p. 12.
"Chas. L. Huisking & Co.; supra, n. 15, at p. 599; see, also, Com'r v. Meridian
'& Thirteenth R. Co., supra, n. 8.
-OHelvering v. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co., supra, n. 12.
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stock. Nevertheless, the cases disclose that, in such a situation, the de-
duction has been allowed 2' and disallowed. 22 Conflicting conclusions
have also been reached where interest was payable only out of earn-
ings.23 Where payment of the so-called interest is discretionary, rather
than mandatory, it manifestly resembles and will doubtless be treated
as a dividend.24 Judicial consideration has also been given to the fact
that the money could have been borrowed from banks at a substantially
lower rate than was payable on the "notes," 25 or that the "creditor"
could share in profits over and above the fixed "interest" rate.
26
5. Treatment on corporate books. When the balance sheet includes
the "debentures" under the heading of "capital stock," a factor is
present to support the disallowance of the deduction. 27 However, such
treatment is not conclusive, but merely evidentiary.
2 s
6. Right to sue in event of default. This iight ordinarily inheres in
a debt, and any limitation thereon will doubtless have a marked or con-
trolling influence in characterizing the security as stock.
29
7. Voting rights. The existence or non-existence of voting rights
clearly constitutes a pertinent factor.3 0
8. Consideration for debentures. Where the so-called "debentures"
have been issued not for money, but in exchange for stock or property,
this element has been considered along with others in determining
225o Hudson St. Corp., supra, n. so; Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corp.,
supra, n. 5; Charles Olson & Sons, Inc., supra, n. io; Helvering v. Richmond, F. &
P. R. Co., supra, n. 12; Com'r v. 0. P. P. Holding Corp., supra, n. 10.
"Texas Drivurself System, Inc., supra, n. 6; Golden Belt Lumber Co., i T. C.
741 (1943).
"Deduction allowed: Com'r v. H. P. Hood & Sons, supra, n. 1o (however, ac-
crued interest was payable at maturity). Deduction disallowed: Swoby Corp., supra,
n. 15; Bowersock Mills & Power Co., supra, n. 1o; Mullin Bldg. Corp., supra, n.
io; Com'r v. Schmoll Fils Assoc'd, Inc., supra, n. 5.
2"Ticker Publishing Co., 46 B. T. A. 399 (1942); Chas. L. Huisking & Co., supra,
n. 15.
2-The Humko Co., supra, n. 17. Cf. Cleveland Alolph Mayer Realty Corp.,
supra, n. 5.
2The Humko Co., supra, n. 17. Cf. Helvering v. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co.,
supra, n. 12.
"Mullin Bldg. Corp., supra, n. io; Texas Drivurself System, Inc., supra, n. 6;
Golden Belt Lumber Co., supra, n. 22; Brown-Rogers-Dixson Co. v. Com'r, supra,
n. 1O.
2sCf. Chas. Olson & Sons, Inc., supra, n. 1o.
"wSee Mullin Bldg. Corp., supra, n. io; Texas Drivurself System, Inc., supra, n.
6; 1432 Broadway Corporation, supra, n. 11. Compare 25o Hudson St., Corp., supra,
n. io; Com'r v. Proctor Shop, supra, n. 5.
mHelvering v. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co., supra, n. 12; cf. Texas Drivurself Sys-
tem, Inc., supra, n. 6. Compare Com'r v. H. P. Hood & Sons, supra, n. 1o; Com'r
v. Proctor Shop, supra, n. 5.
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the real nature of the securities. In Mullin Bldg. Corp.31 the Tax Court
stated: "Also the transaction lacks the elements of a loan. New capital
was not wanted or obtained by the issuance of the debentures. The ab-
sence of a true borrowing element we recognize is not always determina-
tive .... but such absence under certain circumstances is considered as
indicating the creation of a stock interest rather than a debt." Thus,
with this element present, in some instances the securities have been
held to be stock3 2 and in other instances debentures, 33 depending upon
the additional facts and circumstances involved. Where the debentures
were issued in payment of a taxable dividend, this has been considered
as a factor supporting the interest deduction.
34
9. Intent. The above criteria are important principally as aids in
determining whether the parties really intend to create a creditor or a
stockholder relationship to the corporation.35 As the court observed in
Commissioner v. Proctor Shop, Inc.,3 6 "none of the decided cases lay
down any comprehensive rule by which the question presented may be
decided in all cases, and 'the decision in each case turns upon the facts
of that case,' . .. in each case it must be determined whether the real
transaction was that of an investment in the corporation or a loan to
it .... The real intention of the parties is to be sought and in order
to establish it evidence aliunde the contract is admissible." In that
case parol evidence was admitted to show that the "angel" was willing
only to make a loan, and that the hybrid type of security was used to
preserve the corporation's credit.
37
The general nature of the problem under discussion is most aptly
and authoritatively delineated by two cases decided in 1946 by the
Supreme Court, which merit more detailed consideration.
31 Supra, n. o.
2Brown-Rogers-Dixson Co. v. Com'r, supra, n. so; 1432 Broadway Corporation,
supra, n. ix; Swoby Corporation, supra, n. 15; Mullin Bldg. Corp., supra, n. io;
Chas. L. Huisking & Co., supra, n. 15; Golden Belt Lumber Co., supra, n. 22; Rolfe
Bldg. Materials Co., T. C. Memo. Op., Docket No. 110268, Jan. 30, 1943.
nE.g., John Kelley Co. v. Com'r, discussed infra, in text at n. 38; Cleveland
Adolph Mayer Realty Corp., supra, n. 5; Dade-Commonwealth Title Co., 6 T. C.
332 (1946); Annis Furs, Inc., T. C. Memo. Op., Docket No. 110894, Jan. 28, 1943.
mT. R. Miller Mill Co., 37 B. T. A. 43, aff'd i02 F. (2d) 599 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939);
Dade-Commonwealth Title Co., supra, n. 33-
%See, e.g., Mullin Bldg. Corp., supra, n. io; Com'r v. 0. P. P. Holding Corp.,
supra, n. so.
-Supra, n. 5, 82 F. (2d) 792, at 794 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936). This language was
quoted with approval by the First Circuit in Talbot Mills v. Com'r, discussed infra,
in text at n. 41, 146 F. (2d) 8o9, at 811 (C. C. A. 1st, 1944).
I'See, also, Texas Drivurself System, Inc., supra, n. 6; Bowersock Mills & Power
Co., supra, n. so; Ticker Publishing Co., supra, n. 24; Wilshire and Western Sand-
wiches, Inc., T. C. Memo. Op., Docket No., 10638, June 29, 1948.
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In John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner,38 a family corporation was re-
organized through the issuance of $15o,ooo income debentures of which
about $115,000 were exchanged for preferred stock and the balance
sold to the stockholders. The bonds were payable to bearer twenty
years after date. Interest was payable thereon at the annual rate of 8%,
but it was noncumulative and conditioned on the sufficiency of net in-
come to meet the obligation. Holders of the debentures had priority
over common stockholders, but their rights were subordinate to those
of general creditors. The debentures contained typical acceleration
provisions for specific defaults and were redeemable at the option of
the corporation. The Tax Court 39 held that the 8% payments con-
stituted interest and were deductible. The Tax Court decision was
reversed by the Seventh Circuit0 which characterized the debentures
as having every aspect of preferred stock, except that they had a definite
maturity date which, in the appellate court's opinion, was not controll-
ing.
In Talbot Mills v. Commissioner,4' a family corporation had out-
standing 5000 shares of $ioo par stock, of which 4000 shares were sur-
rendered ratably by the stockholders in exchange for $400,000 of the
corporation's notes of registered form, with a definite maturity date.
Interest was payable thereon at an annual rate of not more than io%
nor less than %, subject to a computation that took into considera-
tion the net earnings. Such interest was cumulative, and payment there-
of could be deferred until maturity if necessaky. No dividends on the
stock could be paid until all interest due on the notes was paid. By
action of the directors, the notes could be subordinated to any obliga-
tion maturing not later than the maturity date of the notes. The Tax
Court42 held that io% payments on the notes constituted dividends
and not interest, distinguishing the Kelley case on the ground that in
Kelley a flat rate of interest was payable, rather than a profit-deter-
mined rate. Perhaps another distinguishing feature of the Talbot Mills
case is found in the Tax Court's statement that: "The factor of tax
avoidance loomed large in the minds of the parties, by their own ad-
mission, and indeed it appears to have been the only substantial pur-
pose motivating the transaction."43 In view of all the facts involved
83326 U. S. 521, 66 S. Ct. 299, 90 L. ed. 278 (1946).
3i T. C. 457.
"146 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
42326 U. S. 521, 66 S. Ct. 299, 9o L. ed. 278 (1946).
-3 T. C. 95.
133 T. C. 95, ioo.
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in Talbot Mills, it cannot be said that the tax avoidance feature was
controlling: that it was anything more than one of a number of ele-
ments which together forged the decision. The extent to which the
tax avoidance motive constitutes a proper consideration will be dis-
cussed further below. Placing primary emphasis on the variable in-
terest rate, the First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Tal-
bot Mills.44 Judge Magruder, dissenting, thought the notes were char-
acteristic evidences of indebtedness in that they contained an unquali-
fied obligation to make a fixed principal payment on a day certain,
clothed the holders thereof with no voting power or voice in manage-
ment, and outside the field of taxation the holders thereof would have
the recognized status of creditors.
In the Kelley and Talbot Mills cases, the Tax Court reached op.
posite conclusions on facts which are distinguishable but strikingly
similar. The decisions of the Tax Court in both cases were affirmed by
the Supreme Court, on the basis of the Dobson rule,45 the issues in-
volved being factual, and there being ample evidence to support the
Tax Court's conclusions in both cases. 46 The Supreme Court Justices,
however, were not of one opinion, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Bur-
ton and Mr. Justice Rutledge having dissented.47 Mr. Justice Jackson
took no part in the decisions.
" 146 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. ist, 1944).
ODobson v. Com'r, 32o U. S. 489, 64 S. Ct. 239, 88 L. ed. 248 (1943), holding
that the Tax Court is the final arbiter of facts, and only clearcut questions of law
are reviewable.
6"The documents under consideration embody elements of obligations and
elements of stock. There is no one characteristic, not even exclusion from manage-
ment which can be said to be decisive in the determination of whether the obliga-
tions are risk investments in the corporations or debts. So called stock certificates
may be authorized by corporations which are really debts and promises to pay may
be executed which have incidents of stock. Such situations seem to us to fall within
the Dobson rule." 326 U. S. 521,530, 66 S. Ct. 299, 304, 90 L. ed. 278, 284 (1946). See,
also, the decision of the Second Circuit, affirming the Tax Court in 1432 Broadway
Corporation, supra, n. ii.
'1"I think the judgments in both cases should be affirmed. On the records pre-
sented, I can see no satisfactory basis for deciding one case one way and the other
differently. And I agree with the Court of Appeals that, on the substantially identi-
cal facts, the payments were dividends and not interest." Mr. Justice Rutledge dis-
senting, 326 U. S. 521, 531, 66 S. Ct. 299, 304, 90 L. ed. 278, 284 (1946). "Tax liability
should depend upon the subtle refinements of corporate finance no more than it
does upon the niceties of conveyancing. Sheer technicalities should have no more
weight to control federal tax consequences in one instance than in the other. The
taxing statute draws the line broadly between 'interest' and 'dividend.' This re-
quires one who would claim the interest deduction to bring himself clearly within
the class for which it was intended. That is not done when the usual signposts be-
tween bonds and stock are so obliterated that they become invisible or point equally
[Vol. V
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While the cases provide many helpful guides, it is evident there-
from that the use of a hybrid security, as the product of a desire to take
an interest deduction but to escape the obligation of debt, will proba-
bly raise an issue which is essentially a factual one, and that the an-
swer thereto may remain doubtful until it is judicially decided.
Is There a Business Purpose Doctrine?
Mr. Justice Holmes once said that "... the very meaning of'a line in
the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you
do not pass it."4 8 Unfortunately for many a taxpayer this language
has not been followed literally.
In Gregory v. Helvering 9 the Supreme Court said: "The legal
right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be
his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits,
cannot be doubted. ... But the question for determination is whether
what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the
statute intended .... Putting aside, then, the question of motive in
respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the character of the proceed-
ing by what actually occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation
having no business or corporate purpose-a mere device which put
on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing
its real character ....
Although the Gregory case involved a reorganization, the effort
has been made to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to a variety
of cases, including those presenting the issue of whether the securities
are stock or debt. The question therefore arises as to whether there
must be a corporate business purpose behind a bond issue to prevent
its being called stock. The issue was squarely met in Annis Furs, Inc.,51
decided in 1943. There a deduction was allowed where the corporation
issued 6% debentures in exchange for an equal amount of preferred
stock. In his brief the Commissioner argued, citing the Gregory case,
that the debentures should be treated as stock because the purpose of
their issuance was to secure a permanent income to the debenture hold-
ers, which was a personal, stockholder purpose, rather than a corporate
in both directions at the same time." 326 U. S. 521, 534, 66 S. Ct. 299, 3o6, 9o L.
ed. 278, 306.
'Superior Oil Co. v. Miss., 280 U. S. 390, 395, 50 S. Ct. 169, 17o, 74 L. ed. 504,
5o8 (193o).
'"293 U. S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266, 79 L. ed. 596 (1935).
r0293 U. S. 465, 469, 55 S. Ct. 266, 267, 79 L. ed. 596, 599 (1935).
51Supra; n. 33.
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purpose. The Tax Court rejected this argument in the following
language:
"If in order for petitioner to prevail in this case it was necessary
for petitioner to show that there was a financial reason or some other
similar reason or purpose which made necessary the recapitalization
... we would be inclined to agree with the Commissioner that no
such business purpose has been shown ....
"However, it seems to us that when we have facts brought before
us which show that a corporation and its preferred stockholders did
in fact make an exchange whereby all the preferred stock was taken
up and cancelled and debenture bonds substituted therefor bearing
interest at 6 per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, we must rec-
ognize the change and allow the interest deduction under the provis-
ions of section 23 (b), Internal Revenue Code.
"Of course if the indebtedness represented by the debenture bonds
is a sham indebtedness, and the interest coupons attached to the bonds
represent sham interest obligations, the deduction claimed would not
be allowable. But the facts which have been stipulated seem to us to
show clearly that the indebtedness created by the bonds was a real in-
debtedness and the interest coupons attached to the debentures repre-
sented a bona fide agreement to pay interest according to the tenor
thereof.
"If a corporation and its preferred stockholders for reasons satis-
factory to themselves agree upon an exchange of preferred stock for
debenture bonds, then it seems to us that such is business purpose
enough and we need look no further, provided of course that the obli-
gation created by the bonds is genuine. Cf. Commissioner v. Proctor
Shop, Inc., 82 Fed. (2) 792; John Kelley Company, i T. C. 457."52
At the end of the same year the question respecting the existence
of a corporate business purpose was again discussed in The Humko
Co. 5 3 In that case preferred stock was retired and the proceeds were
simultaneously "loaned" to the corporation under circumstances which
caused the Tax Court to view the transaction as a sham and to treat
the "interest" paid on such "demand loans" as dividends. No resolu-
Rid. at i T. C. M. 507. In the Kelley Case the Tax Court stated, i T. C. 457,
462: "It is apparent that the holders of the preferred stock, in exchanging the stock
for '20 year 8 per cent income debentures,' preferred the debtor-creditor status of
debenture holders to that of stockholders, and stockholders have the right to change





tion had been adopted authorizing the corporation to borrow from its
stockholders, and no notes or written agreement had ever been exe-
cuted. The so-called demand loans carried 6 percent interest, while
the corporation could borrow from banks at 3 percent interest. The
"indebtedness" created by such loans was subordinated to the corpora-
tion's bank indebtedness. The facts and circumstances were such that
the Tax Court viewed the transaction as "unreal on its face." The
Court stated: "The evidence shows that the purported retirement of
the preferred stock was a sham and a device in a tax scheme, that it
had no business purpose to petitioner, and that no debtor-creditor re-
lationship was created by the alleged loans of $176,ooo to petitioner." 54
While agreeing completely with the Court's ultimate conclusion
in the Humko case, some may feel that the reference to "business pur-
pose" is an unhappy and disturbing one: that it casts a cloud of doubt
over the Tax Court's earlier decision in Annis Furs in which the busi-
ness purpose doctrine, as applied to the interest deduction, was flatly re-
jected, and the case of a sham transaction was expressly distinguished.
The Humko case is quite obviously in the "sham" class, and for that
reason some may argue that any consideration or mention therein of the
business purpose doctrine was both unnecessary and improper.
While reference to the lack of a corporate business purpose in Hum-
ko may have been unnecessary, it is the author's opinion that it was not
improper, and that it creates no obstacle in the way of reconciling the
decisions in Humko and Annis Furs. In a "sham" case, the absence of
a corporate business purpose is merely one of the elements or criteria to
be considered along with others, in determining whether the alleged
debtor-creditor relationship is genuine or fictitious. This does not mean
that the existence of a corporate business purpose is essential to the
establishment of a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship. Under the
Code there would seem no warrant for such a rule. But there must be
a genuine debt to support the interest deduction, and there is therefore
ample justification for a consideration of all facts pertinent to the de-
termination of whether a debtor-creditor relationship really exists.
The later cases appear to recognize this distinction. In Clyde Ba-
con, Inc.,55 decided in 1945, the Tax Court found that the debentures
were evidences of indebtedness, and disposed of the business purpose
argument in these words: "At the formation of the corporation there
was no obligation on the petitioner to issue any definite amount of stock
"'Id. at 2 T. C. M. 1125.
64 T. C. 1107 (1945).
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in exchange for the assets received. It had the privilege of determining
the character and amount of its securities so exchanged if they were
satisfactory to the recipient. The petitioner had the right to replace
the stock interest with an evidence of indebtedness, if it so desired ....
The petitioner also presented cogent and proper business reasons for
creating the debenture certificates. It is not necessary to enumerate or
discuss them, since the face of the instrument affords ample ground
for our conclusion that the debenture certificates were evidences of
indebtedness and not shares of stock."
56
The year 1946 found the Commissioner again arguing for the ap-
plication of the business purpose doctrine in the Mayer Realty case.
57
As authority he relied on the now famous Bazley case involving a reor-
ganization,58 in which the business purpose doctrine was applied by
the Tax Court. Rejecting the Commissioner's contention, the Court
stated: "We have no such question before us in this proceeding ....
Our question is merely whether the debentures which were issued by
the petitioner constituted indebtedness of the petitioner and whether
the interest paid upon such debentures is deductible from gross in-
come." 59 The Mayer Realty decision was cited with approval in a later
case where the Tax Court again distinguished the "business purpose"
from the "sham" principle.6°
It will be observed from the foregoing discussion that in cases in
which the debentures have come into existence via the reorganization
route, the tax avoidance motive has been frequently urged and con-
sidered, along with the lack of business purpose, as a basis for disal-
lowance of the interest deduction. To what extent, then, does the tax
avoidance motive constitute a proper element for consideration?
The courts have repeatedly and consistently recognized that "The
legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law
permits, cannot be doubted."61
In Talbot Mills the Tax Court stated that tax avoidance "appears
to have been the only substantial purpose motivating the transaction,"
62
5'Id. at p. 1116.
I'Supra, n. 5.
58J. Robert Bazley, 4 T. C. 897, since then affirmed, 155 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 3 d,
1946), 331 U. S. 737, 67 S. Ct. 1489, 91 L. ed. 1330 (1947).
ICleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corp., supra, n. 5 at p. 741.
"025o Hudson St. Corp., supra, n. 10.





but other factors were also present from which the Court concluded
that "what the parties really intended to create was a security retain-
ing the profit-sharing advantage of stock, leaving intact their voice in
the management, but extending a tax advantage to the corporation not
possible in stock." 63 Certainly it cannot be said that the Tax Court con-
sidered the tax avoidance motive as controlling: as anything more than
an element to be considered in determining whether there was a genu-
ine intent to create a debtor-creditor relationship. Indeed, the Court
stated that "The question [whether the securities are stock or debt] is
factual, and no one factor may be said to be controlling," 64 and then
proceeded to enumerate the "determining factors" among which the
tax avoidance motive does not even appear. The only factor mentioned
to which such a motive could possibly be related is "intent of the par-
ties." In view of the Court's reference to the tax avoidance motive, it is a
reasonable conclusion that the Court regarded this element as material
to the determination of intent. Whether consideration of such motive,
even to this limited extent, is proper, presents a serious question. More-
over, assuming that it is, the inference that a tax saving motive tends
to show the lack of genuine intent to create a debtor-creditor relation-
ship, might well be challenged, as it could be argued with considerable
force that the desire for the interest deduction would indicate an in-
tent to create a debt in order to qualify for such deductions. Undoubt-
edly, in many of the cases where debentures are issued-particularly
where they are issued in exchange for stock-the corporate tax saving
has been a motivating consideration. And yet in only a very small num-
ber of the cases is there even a reference to the tax avoidance motive.
Evidently, the courts have ordinarily felt that such a motive is not
only legal, but immaterial to the issue involved.
Although the First Circuit affirmed the Talbot Mills decision upon
the ground that the question was factual and the Dobson rule gov-
erned,65 Judge Magruder dissented vigorously, and in so doing struck
directly at the core of the problem. He said:
"The result would be no different if we assume that the main mo-
tive for the recapitalization was to achieve a tax advantage. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., i Cir., 1944, 141
F. 2d 467, 471. To test this, suppose that, at the organization of the
corporation, the fifteen individuals who were to put up the money
"Ibid.
"3 T. C. 99.
5See notes 44 and 45, supra.
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had considered the alternatives of having the corporation issue to them
5,000 shares of stock at $ioo a share, or i,ooo shares of the stock and
ordinary interest-bearing notes in an amount of $4oo,ooo; and had
decided on the latter course in order to give the corporation the ad-
vantage of the interest deduction under section 23 (b). This advantage
would have been achieved had they chosen the second alternative at
the outset .... If interest deductibility could be achieved by an
original capitalization as above supposed, it could equally well be
achieved by a subsequent recapitalization along the same lines .... It is
not suggested that the notes are a sham, that is, that they do not embody
the real understanding of the parties to the transaction." 66
It is interesting and perhaps significant to observe that although
the Supreme Court opinion in the Talbot Mills case contains a rather
detailed statement of the facts, no reference whatsoever is made there-
in to the tax avoidance feature.
In 1432 Broadway Corporation, although the deduction was dis-
allowed because "the evidence does not show that the debentures were,
or were intended to be, evidences of indebtedness," 67 the Tax Court
recognized that ". . . a taxpayer has the right to cast his transaction in
such form as he chooses, and the form he chooses will generally be re-
spected ....,68
In the frequently cited case of Commissioner v. H. P. Hood & Sons,
some "debentures" were sold for cash, some were issued as a common
stock dividend, and some were exchanged for preferred stock. The Tax
Court found that the debentures possessed the criteria of indebtedness
and allowed the interest deduction. Affirming, the First Circuit re-
ferred to the Tax Court's finding that although tax saving may have
been one of the considerations, it was not the sole consideration for
the issue. "At any rate," the Court added, "there is nothing to pre-
vent this taxpayer from replacing an instrument [preferred stock]
which rests on one side of the line separating indebtedness from pro-
prietorship with one which rests on the other side of the line."69
While reference was made to the tax avoidance motive in some of
the cases where debentures were issued in exchange for stock, in all
those cases the debentures were mixed-breeds. The same thing is true
of the cases in which reference was made to the lack of business pur-
pose. There appears no sound reason why, quoad the interest deduc-
0146 F. (2d) 809, 813 (C. C. A. ist, 1944).
674 T. C. 1166.
14 T. C. 1165.
69141 F. (2d) 467, 471 (C. C. A. Ist, 1944).
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tion, more rigorous standards should be applied to debentures issued
in a reorganization than to debentures issued otherwise. It is no more
sinful, or any less legal, to reduce an established tax liability by legal
means than to minimize an unborn liability.
While the three theories-sham, lack of corporate business purpose,
and tax avoidance-are frequently boon companions, they are clearly
separable and distinguishable:
All the courts have recognized that section 23 (b) is designed to
permit only the deduction of "genuine interest on a genuine indebted-
ness," and there is no room for quarrel concerning the validity of the
"sham" principle.
While the lack of a corporate business purpose may be one of the
elements entitled to consideration in a sham case, it is nothing more
than that.
Although some cases indicate that the tax avoidance motive may
be considered in determining intent, its materiality and probative value
both seem highly questionable.
Is There An Excessive Debt Structure Rule?
Some recent decisions have also suggested that there might be a
limit to the amount of the debentures, if the interest thereon is to be
deductible. If the corporate debt structure is "excessive" the section
23 (b) interest deduction might be disallowed. Such suggestions in-
spire two questions: Is there really any such rule If so, what consti-
tutes an excessive debt structure? Suppose that X-Corporation carries
out its plan to issue $5oo,ooo in stock and $5oo,ooo in debentures. In
the alternative, suppose that X-Corporation issues only three shares
of qualifying stock and $999,700 in debentures. If there is a line, where
is it to be drawn?
In the Mullin Bldg. Corp. case,70 the capital structure consisted of
$io,ooo common stock and $290,000 of so-called debenture preferred
stock. Upon consideration of all the facts, the Tax Court reached the al-
most inescapable conclusion that the securities were stock. The Court
stated: "Furthermore, the intention of the parties indicates that the de-
benture stock was stock rather than a debt. It was called stock. It was
carried on petitioner's books as capital and so represented to the busi-
ness world. Had it not been so represented petitioner would have ap-
peared as a company with a ratio of debt to capital of 29 to i." The
'OSupra, n. io.
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reference to the debt ratio was manifestly merely incidental to the
matter of intent.
Prior to the recapitalization in the Kelley case, the authorized capi-
tal of the corporation consisted of 15oo shares of no par common and
$3oo,ooo in preferred stock; thereafter, it consisted of $6ooooo in com-
mon and $3oo,ooo in preferred stock, and $250,000 in debentures. The
capital structure of the Talbot Mills corporation was recapitalized from
$5oo,ooo common stock to $ioo,ooo common stock and $400,000 in
"notes." Probably in answer to a question raised by the Commissioner
in his argument, the Supreme Court stated: "As material amounts of
capital were invested in stock, we need not consider the effect of ex-
treme situations such as nominal stock investments and an obviously
excessive debt structure."71 This sentence would seem to mean only
that inasmuch as an "extreme situation" was not involved in those
cases, there was no occasion for the Court to deal with the question.
However, the possibility suggested by the dictum was embraced
in the recent case of Swoby Corporation72 where the stock consisted of
$200 total par value and an "income debenture" of $250,000 was issued.
Judge Opper, in an opinion reviewed by the Court, stated:
"While the specified factual distinction between John Kelley Co.
v Commissioner and Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 326 U. S. 521,
furnishes little assistance in determining whether the 'debenture' in
issue represents an indebtedness and the interest carried by it is
hence deductible, two other factors not present in those cases but al-
luded to by the Supreme Court in the same opinion seem to indicate
that it is not.
"That Court takes occasion to issue what we can not but view as a
warning when it notes that 'As material amounts of capital were in-
vested in stock, we need not consider the effect of extreme situations
such as nominal stock investments and an obviously excessive debt
structure.' (321 U. S. at 526). The necessity excluded there we can
not now avoid. Dealing with property having a stipulated value of
'at least $250,000,' the financing selected was to create a clearly 'nomi-
nal' figure of $200 in the common stock and 'an obviously excessive
debt structure' of $250,000 in the debenture. This evokes a factor evi-
dently regarded as significant by the Supreme Court, which, unlike
either the Talbot Mills or Kelley Co. cases, tends to justify the re-
spondent's treatment."




The other factors involved-the absence, in effect, of a maturity
date falling "in the reasonable future," the subordinate feature of the
"debenture," and the dependency of "interest" payments not only on
available profits, but in reality on the decision of the directors-mani-
festly provided adequate grounds for the Tax Court's decision, without
reference to the excessive debt element.
Although, the application of the excessive debt test has not yet
been dearly defined, the Swoby case indicates that excessive debt is a
factor to be considered, along with all other pertinent factors, in deter-
mining the real nature of the securities.
What constitutes an excessive debt ratio is a question for the fu-
ture. The tacitly approved ratio in the Talbot Mills case was 4 to 1,
and the amount of stock invested was considered material. In the
Mullins case the amount of stock was certainly material, but the ratio
was 29 to i. In Swoby the ratio was 1250 to i, and substantially no
stock was issued. Prior to the decisions in these cases, opinions have
been written involving the following capital structures: $o,ooo stock
and $27o,ooo debentures; 73 about $22,000 stock and $42,ooo notes;
7 4
$20,000 stock and $26o,ooo bonds; 75 $6oo stock and $21o,ooo deben-
tures; 76 $20 stated value stock and $750,00o debenture notes; 77 and
$iooo stock and $99,ooo debenture preferred.78 In none of these cases
was the excessive debt structure theory even mentioned.
The "excessive debt structure" has been considered thus far only
in cases in which hybrid types of securities were involved, and the
courts were called upon to determine whether the securities were stock
or debentures. In such cases, where it is necessary to determine the
real nature of the mongrel, the existence of an excessive debt structure
may be a proper consideration because of its manifest relevancy to the
question of intent. This, however, does not mean the courts should or
will consider and treat simon pure debt as stock, no matter how ex-
cessive the debt may be in relation to stock. In view of the clear man-
date of the Internal Revenue Code, interest paid on genuine indebted-
ness constitutes an allowable deduction, regardless of the debt ratio.
The Commissioner's resort to fiction for the purpose of imposing a tax
would seem just as unwarranted as a taxpayer's for the purpose escap-
SClyde Bacon, Inc., supra, n. 55-
"'Edward G. Janeway, supra, n. 5.
nCom'r v. 0. P. P. Holding Corp., supra, n. lo.
"Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corp., supra, n. 5.
"25 o Hudson St. Corp., supra, n. 1o.
"Com'r v. Proctor Shop, supra, n. 5.
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ing it. Under the law, taxpayers have the choice of doing business as a
corporation or as a partnership. If they select the latter, they, of course,
pay no corporate tax. They are entitled to the same freedom of choice
respecting the manner in which they capitalize their corporations.
Moreover, the need and desirability of having fixed standards for the
measurement of taxes should deter courts from using such a variable as
an "excessive debt structure" as an ultimate standard.
From the foregoing discussion the moral seems clear: if one wants
to avoid the rocks and shoals which make tax navigation both difficult
and dangerous, he would do well to set sail in a sound craft and to
follow closely the established charts which define the boundaries of
stocks and bonds.
